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This paper investigates the relationship between the level of experience of managers and founders, 
and the likelihood of survival of their new firms. We take advantage of a comprehensive dataset 
covering the entire Danish labor market from 1980-2000. This is used to trace the activities of top 
ranked members of start-ups prior to their founding, and follow the fate of these firms. More 
specifically, we compare the survival of spin-offs from surviving parents, spin-offs from exiting 
parents, and other start-ups. Moreover, we investigate whether firms managed and founded by more 
experienced teams with higher levels of industry-specific experience are more likely to survive. 
Distinguishing between survivors and firms that have been acquired, we find that spin-offs from a 
surviving parent company combined with and industry-specific experience, positively affects the 
likelihood of survival. We also find that spin-offs from parent companies that exit are less likely to 
survive than either spin-offs from surviving parents or other start-ups. These findings support the 
theoretical arguments that organizational heritage is important for the survival of new organizations. 
We found no similar significant results when comparing exits with firms that have been acquired.  
 
Key words: Organizational routine, Industry-specific experience, Survival of new firms, Spin-offs 









This paper has benefited greatly from discussions with Steven Klepper on various occasions. It is 
based on empirical evidence from a dataset maintained by Centre for Corporate Performance 
(CCP), Aarhus School of Business, Denmark. We thank Niels Westergaard-Nielsen and Henrik 
Mathiesen (both from CCP) for helping us with getting access to the dataset. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the 10th International Schumpeter Society Conference, Bocconi 
University, Milan, 9-12 June 2004. Comments from Ammon Salter and Thomas Åstebro are 






Are you experienced? 
 
Prior experience and the survival of new organizations 
 
1 Introduction 
How does the experience of the founding team shape the performance of start-ups? Does a more 
experienced management and founding team increase the chances of survival of a new 
organization? The establishment of new firms and their entrance into an industry are generally 
seen as key determinants of economic development and the evolution of the industry 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Consequently, the performance of new organizations is also very important 
for economic development and growth. The importance of industry-specific experience to the 
performance of new organizations is the central theme of the present paper. 
 
Organizational sociologists have for a long time been interested in the transfer of routines and 
experience from a founder’s previous employer to the new firm (Phillips, 2002). The argument 
that the blueprints of a parent firm are passed on to new organizations through their founders is 
the cornerstone of a line of research by scholars such as Brittain and Freeman (1986), Carroll 
(1984), Hannan and Freeman (1986), and Romanelli (1985; 1989). The work of these scholars 
represented a brief, but very active line of research on the background of founders, in the 1980s 
(Phillips, 2002). These ideas have recently been revamped by contributions from Klepper 
(2001; 2002), Carroll et al. (1996), and Helfat and Lieberman (2002). The central argument of 
these contributions is that the survival and success of new organizations are fundamentally 
shaped by the pre-entry experiences of their founders. This relationship has been studied in the 
management literature, but from the perspective of the relationship between the experiences of 
top managers and performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bantel, 1989; Murray, 1989; 
Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
 
In this paper we study the phenomenon in greater detail. More specifically, we want to 
empirically test these arguments on a wider sample of new firms. So far, the empirical 
investigations have been based on single case studies of the evolution of selected industries, 
notably in the US. To lend weight to these investigations, we look at the entire Danish 




question in this study is: How are the experiences of managers and founders related to the 
survival of start-ups? 
 
Using a comprehensive longitudinal panel dataset, which covers all employees and thus all 
start-ups in Denmark, we compare the survival of spin-offs from surviving parents, spin-offs 
from exiting parents, and other start-ups. Moreover, we investigate whether firms managed and 
founded by teams with a relatively high level of industry-specific experience also are more 
likely to survive. Regarding survival, we distinguish between exits, survivors that have been 
acquired by another firm (takeovers), and firms that survive as independent units in terms of 
control and ownership.  
 
We find that spin-offs from surviving parents are more likely themselves to survive compared to 
all other types of start-ups. Furthermore, spin-offs from parents that exit are less likely to 
survive compared to all other start-ups. In general, there is clear evidence that industry-specific 
experience positively affects the likelihood of survival. These findings support the theoretical 
arguments that experience-based organization heritage is important for the survival of new 
organizations. It is the type of experience that determines the likelihood of survival of firms. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the theoretical/empirical framework and 
central propositions tested in the paper. Section three describes the database and its contents, the 
methods used, and the descriptive statistics of the variables. The results of the empirical model 
are presented in Section four. This is followed by a discussion of the results and the concluding 
remarks in Section five. 
 
2  Theoretical framework and central propositions 
All entrepreneurs bring to their firms knowledge and skills from their past work activities and 
education experience. This is of value in searching for new business areas and opportunities as 
well as in the day-to-day running of a firm (Shane, 2000). Thus, all entrants into an industry 
carry skills and routines embodied in their founders, who are very likely to influence the new 
firm’s future development and success. Start-ups that enter the same industry in which their 
founders were previously employed are labeled spin-offs. This type of entry is one of the most 
common (Garvin, 1983). Founders of spin-offs are likely to bring specific knowledge about a 
wide range of issues to their new firm, e.g. customer demand, products, technologies, suppliers 




exploit new knowledge and technological developments based on unmet supplier or customer 
demands (as found by Shane, 2000) or prior scientific and technical training (as found by 
Roberts, 1991). Consequently, more experienced founders, e.g. spin-offs, with valuable 
industry-specific knowledge should have a higher probability of success compared with less 
experienced entrants. If this holds true, then the success of a new entrant must depend on the 
experience of the founder. 
 
Klepper (2001) uses the metaphor of spin-offs as children, and past employers as parents. He 
proposes an evolutionary model that combines the ideas of reproduction and inheritance with 
the notion of organizational routines. Nelson and Winter (1982) use this notion and assume that 
firms are to a large extent governed by organizational routines. A firm has separate routines for 
the different functions (R&D, marketing, management, etc.) and products involved in its 
operation. The founders and/or the initial management team install these routines. Decision 
making at all levels will subsequently depend on these routines, and they will govern the 
evolution of the firm. When a new firm is born, organizations are reproduced, because founders 
will rely on routines with which they are already familiar from their previous employment 
experience, and which have already been shown to be successful. 
 
The quality of the routines will determine the future success and performance of the new firm. 
Entrepreneurial spin-offs may inherit better routines than any other kind of start-up, as a result 
of the experience and background of their founders. This may enable spin-offs on average to 
outperform other start-ups. Eventually their longer survival and better performance will one day 
turn entrepreneurial spin-offs into parents, since employees with access to better routines will be 
more likely to found new organizations (Klepper, 2001). Thus, better performing firms will 
spawn more spin-offs, and more experienced entrepreneurs will establish more successful firms. 
 
When a firm grows, it includes new technologies and products in its business. Accordingly, the 
organizational routines change and consequently will influence the performance of the firm. The 
firm will diverge more and more from its starting point and thus its parents. Firms will become 
less similar as will their performance. Changing routines will change the choices made about 
product development and innovation. In other words, entrepreneurial spin-offs will be a source 
of diversity as they develop more distinctive innovations over time – they will thus stimulate the 
rate of technological change in an industry. A common denominator of the existing research is 
that leading firms in industries may risk losing their dominant position to new entrants 




firms may not recognize what might be critical deficiencies in their resource profile and routines 
necessary for coping with changing market conditions (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). At the 
same time, new spin-offs will have more flexible routines, which will enable them to perform 
relatively better under volatile conditions. 
 
The average competences of diversifying firms are assumed to be greater than the average 
competences of the new firms because they have more comprehensive organizational 
experiences and complementary assets. But if the organizational challenges facing an industry 
are novel and sufficiently complex, new firms may be able to reach or exceed the average 
competence level of diversifiers and incumbents. This is because the routines in new firms tend 
to be more flexible in relation to demand challenges and changing conditions. Inexperienced 
firms will not be able to compete with any diversifier or spin-off, because they lack the 
necessary experience and routines. If organizational challenges are not novel, diversifiers will 
be more likely to dominate the industry (Klepper, 2003).  
 
In summary, the existing theoretical literature and empirical investigations argue that spin-offs 
from competitive parents will perform relatively better than other start-ups because of the 
experience embedded in the organizations. Such spin-offs are likely to rely on the organizational 
routines from previous firms that have already adapted to the environment and also have been 
proven to be competitive. The hypothesis is that firms founded by more experienced personnel 
are more likely survive than other firms.  
 
3 Data  and  method 
In order to investigate the importance of pre-entry experiences for the survival of new 
organizations, we rely on a comprehensive dataset with information for the entire Danish 
economy. This dataset combines very detailed information on all individuals and all 
establishments, gathered from the official registers of the Danish government, which records 
unusually detailed information about the economic activities in the country due to its extensive 
welfare policies. As a result, it covers all Danish firms and plants as well as the entire Danish 
labor market. The dataset is maintained by Statistics Denmark under the name ‘Integreret 
Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning (IDA)’ (which translates to: ‘Integrated Database for 
Labor Market Research’). The dataset is internationally recognized as being extremely useful 
for economic and other social science research. Recent publications that have exploited this 





IDA contains several elements and characteristics that make it particularly interesting for 
economic and social science research. First, it holds extensive information on the characteristics 
of individuals, e.g. sex, age, length and level of education, work experience, occupation, family 
status and relations, household characteristics, wages and other income, wealth, and 
unemployment. Second, individuals are matched directly with establishments and employers. It 
is possible to distinguish between plants and firms, which are characterized by their location, 
industrial affiliation and other basic information. Third, the database is longitudinal. It has been 
updated annually since 1980, and thus it is possible to follow individuals, plants and firms from 
one year to another. 
 
Additionally, the identity of plants and firms is preserved over time. If a plant is bought by 
another firm, the plant retains its original identity, unless the majority of the employees leave 
the firm. This means that unless the structure and the group of employees changes during the 
takeover, a plant will not be labeled as an exit if it is taken over.  
 
Our study takes a different starting point from the existing studies in this area. These existing 
studies are generally more narrow, single industry studies, where the entrants into the industry 
can be diversifiers from other industries. So the entrants in these studies are not necessarily new 
firms, but can have a background in other industries. In the present study, all entrants are new 
firms. In fact, we are able to capture all start-ups in the Danish economy using this dataset. We 
are not able to follow very specifically defined industries, such as automobiles or 
semiconductors, but have to rely on aggregations of statistical industry classifications. The data 
sources used in this study carry anonymous entities, and, unlike most other studies, it is not 
possible to identify industries. 
 
Using this database, we identify all new entrants in manufacturing industries from 1984 to 1991 
for the analysis. We selected this particular interval, because the definition of the industry 
variable and its construction changed significantly in 1992, which means that some plants 
change industries as a result of the new method. We have chosen not to consider new firms 
from more recent years, because of the inconsistency between past and present industry 
classifications. Including the new firms from more recent years would represent a possible 
problem when we construct the industry-experience variable. When identifying new firms, we 




firms. Start-ups are thus defined as plants with no prior identity number and which are 
associated to a firm that has no prior identity number. 
 
After identifying the entrants, we use a method similar to that applied by Åstebro and Bernhardt 
(2003) by defining them as survivors if they still exist five years on. Furthermore, if another 
firm has acquired the start-up plant in this period, it is assigned as a takeover. The remaining 
start-ups are categorized as exits. In total from 1984 to 1991, there are 2497 observations in our 
sample, which carry the necessary information. The multinomial survival variable is the 
dependent variable in the regressions below. The outcomes are exit (1), takeover (2) or survival 
(3).  
 
All entrants are linked to the data on individuals in the database. Using the occupation variable, 
the top-ranked members of each entrant are identified. These individuals are the founders and/or 
the initial management team of the entrant. Based on information on this management team, we 
construct a dummy variable indicating whether the entrant is a spin-off. A spin-off in this study 
is defined as an entrant if at least two members of the management team were employed in the 
same firm active in the same six-digit industry the year before the founding. 
 
It is important to note that we are not able to clearly identify founders given the construction of 
the dataset. We can however accurately identify initial managers. We argue that the vast 
majority of new Danish firms are very likely to be managed by their founders, and therefore we 
rely on the assumption that this is the case. In addition, the theoretical framework can be applied 
to managers as well, since the same analytical aspects relate to the experiences of managers as 
founders. 
 
In order to integrate the theoretical argument that good firms will spawn better spin-offs, the 
quality of the parent firm is taken into account. Accordingly, we distinguish between spin-offs 
with a parent that survives after the founding year of its progeny, and spin-offs with a parent 
that exits after the founding year of the progeny.
1 The paper therefore operates with a three-level 
start-up variable indicating spin-off from surviving parent (3) spin-off from exiting parent (2) 
and other start-ups (1). 
 
                                                 
1 As an alternative approximation of the quality of parents, the industrial market share (in terms of share of employment) was also 
calculated. This ratio was tested in the estimations as the share itself or as a dummy for the quartile of market share ratio (top 25%, 
mid-high 25%, mid-low 25%, and low 25%). However, neither of these variables was significant in any of the models estimated. 




Additionally, we test whether industry-specific experience of the initial managing team is 
important to understand why firms survive or not. The experience of this team is estimated by 
looking at their previous four years of employment activity. Based on these activities, the 
experience is calculated as the total number of years that the members have been employed (or 
active) in the same six-digit industry of the entrant. The years are weighted exponentially so 
experience in the most resent year is valued as relatively more important. If the start-up is 
founded in 1991, the past experience of the management team is tracked from 1990 and back to 
1987. For each member of the team, a value of 1 is assigned for each year that the person is 
active in the same industry as the start-up. These numbers are then weighted by 1.000, 0.500, 
0.250 and 0.125 for the years 1990, 1989, 1988 and 1987, respectively. This variable is the 
proxy for previous industry experience and represents the sum of total experience of the 
management team. 
 
The final experience variable refers to having been previously employed in a start-up. It is 
computed in a similar fashion to the industry experience variable. We go back four years from 
the event of founding and trace the history of the top members. Given that they have been 
employed in a start-up before, we devise a weighted additive variable. These values are summed 
for the entire management team as in the calculating the industry experience variable. This 
variable is a proxy for the experiences that individuals carry in respect of being a part of the 
start-up process, and which may influence the survival chances of the present start-up. 
 
Three control variables have been added. First, a variable controlling for the level of education 
of the employees in the firm is included. We apply the same method as Åstebro and Bernhardt 
(2003) by constructing variables that denote the relative share of employees in various 
educational levels. We consider three levels of education. High level is a long education equal 
to a five-year university education or higher. This includes all university masters and Ph.D. 
programs. Medium level is an education equal to all university bachelor level programs or 
similar length of education from another type of education institutions. Low level is a short 
education equal to a high school degree, tradesman/craftsman education, and similar education 
of up to three years duration after primary school education. 
 
The second control variable adjusts for the general economic business cycles in the founding 
year. The growth rate of the Danish economy in this year is included in the analysis in order to 
account for cyclical effects on the survival rate of start-ups. Finally, we control for industry 






Table 1 presents the distribution of the observations across the categorical variables. The dataset 
contains 2497 start-ups of which about 57% survive. Just above 20% of the survivors were 
acquired by another firm in the course of the five years considered.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>  
 
About 13% of the start-ups are spin-offs according to the definition applied. Our data seem to 
suggest that, contrary to what Garvin (1983) suggests, spin-offs are not the most frequent start-
up firm. The reason for our different finding may be due to our more strict definition of spin-
offs. About 10% of the start-ups are spin-offs from surviving firms, while the remaining almost 
3% are spin-offs from parents that have closed. There is a significantly higher percentage of 
spin-offs from better performing firms than from poor performing firms, which supports 
Klepper (2001). The distribution of the observation across the seven-level industry classification 
shows that machinery and electronics, and wood, paper and graphics account for the majority of 
the start-ups at almost 40% and just over 20%, respectively. The non-metallic minerals industry 
accounts for the lowest number of start-ups, i.e. only about 4.5% of the observations.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the most basic descriptive statistics of the variables and the correlation 
matrix. Some of the statistics confirm the details presented in Table 1. We use four different 
kinds of start-up variables. Variable 1.a refers to a variable in which all three categories of the 
start-up variable (spin-off from surviving parent (3), spin-off from exiting parent (2) and other–
start-up (1)) are included. It confirms that other start-ups are the most frequent with a 1.23 mean 
and a median at 1. The remaining spin-off variables are constructs based on variable 1.a. One by 
one we excluded the categories and looked only at a sub-sample of the dataset. This enabled us 
to benchmark each of the spin-off levels against each of the other levels without taking the third 
into account. The descriptive statistics of these variables confirm that we have more other start-
ups than spin-offs from surviving parents, more spin-offs from surviving parents than from 
exiting parents and hence more other start-ups than spin-offs from exiting parents. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>  
 
It is difficult to say anything about the two other experience related variables in the dataset 




is 1.31 on the mean, indicating that some firms do have a considerable number of members in 
the managing team that have experience with the specific six-digit industry in which the firm is 
operating. The median is zero indicating the distribution to be right skewed confirming that the 
variable is truncated at zero.  
 
The medians of the education variables indicate that a considerable number of the firms are 
founded with managers with neither a high nor a medium level education. On the mean, these 
start-ups may be categorized as having 6% of the workers in the managing team with a high 
level of education. Finally, the cyclical effect variable shows that the economy on average is 
growing at approximately 6% per year in the period analysis, assuming that the number of start-
ups is consistent over the years. 
 
As shown in the correlation matrix, the main variables of interest are significantly correlated. 
The experience based variables all show significant correlation estimates. In particular, the 
industry experience variable is highly correlated with the spin-off variables. This is due to the 
fact that spin-offs have initial managers that also come from the same industry. The significant 
correlation estimates also suggest that a gradual introduction of the experience variables may 
show diversified results.   
 
The cyclical effect variable also seems to be highly correlated with the other variables. Only the 
industry dummy and the fourth start-up experience variable are not significantly correlated with 
this variable. The survival variable does exhibit some correlation with the explanatory variables. 
 
4 Results 
The model to be estimated predicts the probability of survival of a start-up. The dependent 
variable is a multinomial response variable with three response levels (exits, acquired survivors, 
independent survivors). We therefore apply a polytomous logistic regression in which there is 
no underling assumption that the dependent variable is ordered. The distinction between 
survivors and takeovers makes it especially problematic to assume that the variable is ordered. 
The method applied involves a maximum likelihood estimation of parameters. Since the 
dependent variable has three levels, two functions will be estimated. As we have chosen exit as 
our base category, the first function refers to the logistic function between exits (0) and 





Tables 3a and 3b summarize the results of the regressions.
2 Four different datasets are used. 
Model 1 includes the total number of start-ups. The three others include sub-samples of the total 
sample. Model 2 includes the categories other start-ups and spin-offs from surviving firms. This 
amounts to 2429 observations. Model 3 includes the 2242 observations categorized either as 
other start-ups or spin-offs from exiting parents. Finally, Model 4 analyses the observations that 
are either spin-offs from surviving parents or from exiting parents, which is 323 observations. 
Each of the four sub-samples has three estimated models (a-c) with a gradual introduction of the 
experience variables. In total, 12 regressions are estimated. The Pearson Chi
2 statistics suggest 
that all 12 models fit the data well.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 3a ABOUT HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3b ABOUT HERE> 
 
The results confirm that spin-offs from surviving parents have a higher probability of survival 
regardless of benchmarking against other start-ups (Model 1 and 2) or spin-offs from exiting 
parents (Model 4). All parameter estimates of the function for survivors with respect to spin-offs 
from surviving parents are significantly positive. Five of the nine estimates are significant at the 
1% level. The remaining four are significant at a 5% level. The levels depend somewhat on the 
model considered. In benchmarking against other start-ups, spin-offs from surviving parents 
have a between 1.5 and 2.2 times greater chance of surviving compared to exiting (see Model 
1a-c and 2a-c). The corresponding ratios of odds when benchmarking against spin-offs from 
exiting parents are even higher. The estimated parameter estimates (1.20 and 1.34 in model 4a 
and 4c) suggest odds ratios between 3.67 and 3.82.  
 
The variable of spin-off from surviving parents is less impressive if we look at the function 
between exits and takeovers. Even though they are all positive, only a few of the parameters are 
significant (Models 1a and 2a). The variable is less suited to explaining the difference between 
these outcomes. 
 
Models 1 and 3 analyze whether there is a statistical difference in the survival probability 
between other start-ups and spin-offs from exiting parents. The results are rather mixed with 
significant estimates only for the function for survivors. A certain significance pattern emerges, 
nevertheless. It seems that we need to include the industry experience variable in the regression 
                                                 




to find any significance. The parameter estimates of spin-offs from exiting parents are not 
significant in Models 1a and 3a, but they are significant in Models 1b-c and 3b-c. The 
significant estimates suggest that other start-ups have a between 2.12 (Model 3b-c) and 2.39 
(Model 3b-c) greater chance of surviving than exiting. 
 
At first sight, the industry experience variable seems to give rather vague results. However this 
first impression is misleading. All functions that compare exits to survivors and include spin-
offs with surviving parents, show significant and positive estimates. This suggests that 
especially spin-offs from surviving parents diversify themselves compared to the other types of 
start-ups. These spin-offs have a much higher probability of survival than any other start-ups.  
 
All parameter estimates of the start-up experience variable are non-significant. The start-up 
experience variable has a very limited effect on the results expressed by comparing the b models 
to the c models. None of the parameters changes significantly when the start-up experience 
variable is introduced.     
 
Finally, the cyclical effect variable is significantly positive in the majority of the regressions, 
when considering exit firms compared to survivors. This suggests that start-ups have a higher 
chance of surviving if they are founded in a year in which the economy in general is growing. 
 
5  Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study is based on an unusually comprehensive dataset, which contains very accurate 
information, and this has important advantages for an investigation of firms’ survival. In the 
construction of the data many issues are taken into account, some of which would be 
problematic for other studies with similar register-based census data. One of the disadvantages 
of other data sources is that the identity of firm is not well handled over time, and surviving 
firms, which are acquired by other firms, appear to be exits. In the present dataset, these types of 
changes in identity are overruled by the statistics office unless the group of employees is 
radically different after the acquisition. This is a clear advantage in this type of study, which 
enables us to separate the acquired firms from the exits and the other survivors. These firms are 
labeled as takeovers. 
 
The results give support to the theoretical proposition that the likelihood of survival is positively 




managers with experience are more likely to survive than relatively less experienced start-ups. 
This finding supports the general argument that the life chances of new organizations will be 
positively influenced by industry-specific experience of their founders and managers. 
Knowledge and experience from within the same industry will make start-ups more successful 
from the outset, because their routines will be better shaped to continue in business.  
 
The effects of inherited routines on survival are shown to be even stronger, when considering 
the different types of start-ups. Spin-offs with surviving parents from the same industry perform 
remarkably better than other spin-offs, and other start-ups. Comparing the survival chances of 
spin-offs with surviving parents, with those of spin-offs with exiting parents, shows that 
inherited routines have a remarkable effect. Our results suggest that spin-offs with surviving 
parents have an up to four times higher chance of survival. The effects are not so remarkable 
when we compare spin-offs with surviving parents to other start-ups. Here, the likelihood of 
survival for spin-offs of surviving parents is twice as high as that of other start-ups. These are 
very powerful results and illustrate the importance of the right type of experience rather than 
just experience. It is clearly a benefit to have experience from a parent organization that 
survives. Even though this is a rather crude measure of the parent’s success, it nevertheless 
indicates that prior experience in such an organization facilitates access to knowledge and 
routines, which ultimately will be of significant benefit to the employee(s) involved in a start-
up.  
 
The type of experience that entrepreneurs and initial managers carry from other firms in the 
industry thus seems to be very important for the likelihood of survival of their own new 
organization. Entrepreneurs and initial managers with a history in the industry, but from firms 
that are not able to continue their operations, will carry routines of low fitness, which, according 
to the theory, will be a disadvantage. Spin-offs from exiting parents may have been pushed out 
of existing employment because the parents were facing closure. In our analysis, spin-offs with 
exiting parents perform significantly worse than any other type of start-up and especially when 
compared to spin-offs with surviving parents. However, spin-offs with exiting parents also 
perform worse than other start-ups. In fact, they have only around a 50 per cent chance of 
survival compared to other start-ups. This result that it is better not to spin-off than to become a 
spin-off with an exiting parent. It is important to take the history into account when studying 
spin-offs and to understand that these organizations are rather heterogeneous in this respect. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that the quality of parent firm will have vital influence on 





The results of the present study imply that the best start-ups come from the best existing firms. 
As a result of their higher chances of survival, these start-ups bring higher benefits to the 
economy. They have the prior experiences and industry-specific knowledge that enable them to 
perform better than other start-ups. Even though industry-specific experience generally 
increases the chances of survival of new firms, our study shows that experience gained in an 
exiting firm is a direct disadvantage for a new organization. This clearly demonstrates that it is 
the type of experience and the type of start-up, which is at the centre of survival and subsequent 
long-term economic growth. Many market economies from the West (Denmark certainly 
included) focus heavily on entrepreneurship and increased firm founding to promote economic 
growth. This occurs often with no account being taken of our finding that the background of the 
start-ups has clear and significant effects on life chances. It would perhaps be more rational for 
policy makers to focus on specific types of start-up rather than simply encouraging increased 
numbers of start-ups.  
 
Our findings and those in numerous other empirical studies find that organizations founded by 
individuals from within the industry have relatively higher chances of survival. This result 
clearly directs the attention towards the possible negative effect of non-compete covenants in 
the contracts of employees. If spin-offs are more likely to survive, they will also be socially 
beneficial and provide the economy with valuable input by promoting growth. In this respect, it 
would probably be of benefit to the economy if firms could be dissuaded from imposing 
conditions that prevent former employees from starting up businesses within the same industry. 
In fact, legislators may want to reduce any stigma often associated with employees that leave a 
company to start their own firms. 
 
The findings in this paper imply that organizational routines carried to spin-offs from their 
parents have a significant impact on the performance of new organizations. Spin-offs from 
better performing parents are based on better routines, which positively increases their chances 
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Table 1: Distribution of observations across the categorical variables 
Number of  Percentage of Cumulative  Cumulative 
Variable observations observations No. of obs. Percentage
Survival
Survivor 1186 47.50 2497 100.00
Takeover 239 9.57 1311 52.50
Exit 1072 42.93 1072 42.93
Start-up
Other start-ups (1) 2174 87.06 2497 100.00
Spin-offs from exiting parents (2) 68 2.72 323 12.94
Spin-offs from surviving parents (3) 255 10.21 255 10.21
Industry
Food, beverages and tobacco (1) 258 10.33 258 10.33
Textile and footware (2) 261 10.45 519 20.78
Wood, paper and graphics (3) 522 20.91 1041 41.69
Chemical (4) 128 5.13 1169 46.82
Non-metallic mineral (5) 111 4.45 1280 51.26
Machinery and electronics (6) 992 39.73 2272 90.99
Furniture (7) 225 9.01 2497 100.00




Table 2: Basic descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 1a 1b 1c 1d 2 3 4a 4b 4c 5 6 7
1. Start-up
1a. Three level variable 1.23 1.00 0.62
1b. Spin-off from suriving parent (2) vs. Other start-up (1) 1.10 1.00 0.31 1.00
1c. Spin-off from exiting parent (2) vs Other start-up (1) 1.03 1.00 0.17 1.00 .
1d. Spin-off from surviving parent (2) vs from exiting parent (1) 1.79 2.00 0.41 1.00 . .
2. Industry experience 1.31 0.00 2.37 0.75 0.77 0.68 -0.12
3. Start-up experience 0.09 0.00 0.48 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.04
4. Education
4a. High education 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.26 0.02 -0.02
4b. Medium education 0.21 0.00 0.36 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.03 -0.02 0.12
4c. Low eduction 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.17 -0.28
5. Cyclical effect 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03
6. Industry 4.38 5.00 1.96 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.01
7. Survival 1.95 2.00 0.95 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.23 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07
Source: Ever Private Sector Dataset maintained by CCP at Aarhus School of Business. 




Table 3a: Results of the multinomial regression analysis with exit being the benchmark for the two remaining functions 
Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std.
Variables Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev.
Survive function
Spin-off from surviving parent 0.79 *** 0.15 0.42 ** 0.21 0.42 ** 0.21 0.79 *** 0.15 0.45 ** 0.23 0.45 ** 0.23
Spin-off from exiting parent -0.41 0.27 -0.87 *** 0.34 -0.87 *** 0.34
Other Start-up benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark
Industry experience 0.07 ** 0.03 0.07 ** 0.03 0.07 * 0.03 0.07 * 0.03
Start-up experience -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.10
Education
High -0.15 0.17 -0.15 0.17 -0.15 0.17 -0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.18
Medium -0.11 0.13 -0.12 0.13 -0.12 0.13 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 0.13
Low 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.18
Cyclical effect 1.97 ** 0.85 2.04 ** 0.85 2.07 ** 0.86 1.95 ** 0.86 2.00 ** 0.86 2.01 ** 0.86
Constant -0.39 ** 0.17 -0.43 ** 0.18 -0.43 ** 0.18 -0.37 ** 0.18 -0.41 ** 0.18 -0.41 ** 0.18
Takeover function
Spin-off from surviving parent 0.53 ** 0.24 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.54 ** 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.38
Spin-off from exiting parent -0.17 0.45 -0.31 0.54 -0.28 0.54
Other Start-up benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark
Industry experience 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Start-up experience 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.15
Education
High -0.42 0.35 -0.42 0.35 -0.42 0.34 -0.35 0.34 -0.34 0.34 -0.35 0.34
Medium -0.52 ** 0.24 -0.52 ** 0.24 -0.52 ** 0.24 -0.45 * 0.24 -0.45 * 0.24 -0.45 * 0.24
Low -0.06 0.30 -0.07 0.30 -0.07 0.30 -0.04 0.30 -0.05 0.30 -0.05 0.30
Cyclical effect 1.19 1.41 1.20 1.41 1.02 1.42 1.39 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.25 1.43
Constant -1.97 *** 0.32 -1.98 *** 0.32 -1.97 *** 0.32 -1.97 *** 0.32 -2.00 *** 0.32 -1.99 *** 0.32
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2497 2497 2497 2429 2429 2429
Pearson Chi^2 81.84 *** 87.73 *** 90.35 *** 79.44 *** 83.34 *** 85.58 ***
Source: Ever Private Sector Dataset maintained by CCP at Aarhus School of Business. 
Note: *: P<0.1, **: P<0.05, ***: P<0.01.





Table 3b: Results of the multinomial regression analysis with exit being the benchmark for the two remaining functions 
Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std. Par. Std.
Variables Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev. Est. Dev.
Survive function
Spin-off from surviving parent 1.20 *** 0.32 1.30 *** 0.33 1.34 *** 0.33
Spin-off from exiting parent -0.41 0.27 -0.75 ** 0.37 -0.75 ** 0.38 benchmark benchmark benchmark
Other Start-up benchmark benchmark benchmark
Industry experience 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.11 *** 0.04 0.11 *** 0.04
Start-up experience 0.00 0.10 -0.19 0.18
Education
High -0.15 0.17 -0.15 0.17 -0.15 0.17 0.09 0.52 -0.03 0.53 -0.12 0.54
Medium -0.10 0.13 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 0.13 -0.30 0.42 -0.40 0.42 -0.40 0.43
Low 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.19 -0.14 0.64 -0.21 0.64 -0.17 0.64
Cyclical effect 2.12 ** 0.89 2.14 ** 0.89 2.13 ** 0.89 1.11 2.79 1.94 2.84 2.49 2.88
Constant -0.45 ** 0.18 -0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19 -0.48 0.57 -1.18 * 0.64 -1.25 * 0.65
Takeover function
Spin-off from surviving parent 0.77 0.52 0.83 0.53 0.79 0.53
Spin-off from exiting parent -0.15 0.45 0.28 0.59 0.28 0.59 benchmark benchmark benchmark
Other Start-up benchmark benchmark benchmark
Industry experience -0.08 0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Start-up experience 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.23
Education
High -0.53 0.38 -0.53 0.38 -0.53 0.38 -0.21 0.88 -0.27 0.88 -0.26 0.89
Medium -0.53 ** 0.25 -0.52 ** 0.25 -0.52 ** 0.25 -1.24 0.77 -1.30 * 0.78 -1.29 * 0.78
Low 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.31 -1.18 1.08 -1.19 1.09 -1.24 1.10
Cyclical effect 1.65 1.48 1.62 1.47 1.50 1.48 -6.42 5.05 -5.92 5.07 -6.43 5.12
Constant -1.99 *** 0.33 -1.95 *** 0.33 -1.95 *** 0.33 -2.10 * 1.24 -2.50 * 1.32 -2.40 * 1.32
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2242 2242 2242 323 323 323
Pearson Chi^2 49.61 *** 53.59 *** 54.87 *** 31.6 * 38.93 ** 41.64 **
Source: Ever Private Sector Dataset maintained by CCP at Aarhus School of Business. 
Note: *: P<0.1, **: P<0.05, ***: P<0.01.





Table 4a: Marginal effects of Models 1a-c and 2a-c 
Models / Variables
Spin-off from surviving parent -0.18 *** 0.01 0.17 *** -0.10 ** 0.02 0.08 * -0.10 ** 0.02 0.08 *
Spin-off from exiting parent 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.18 ** 0.00 -0.18 *** 0.18 ** 0.00 -0.18 ***
Industry experience -0.02 ** 0.00 0.02 ** -0.02 ** 0.00 0.02 **
Start-up experience 0.00 0.02 -0.02
High education 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.02
Medium education 0.05 -0.04 ** -0.01 0.05 -0.04 ** -0.01 0.05 -0.04 ** -0.01
Low education -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03
Cyclical effect -0.46 ** 0.02 0.44 ** -0.47 ** 0.02 0.45 ** -0.47 ** 0.00 0.46 **
Spin-off from surviving parent -0.18 *** 0.01 0.17 *** -0.10 ** 0.00 0.10 * -0.10 ** 0.00 0.10 *
Industry experience -0.02 * 0.00 0.01 * -0.02 * 0.00 0.01 *
Start-up experience -0.01 0.02 -0.01
High education 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
Medium education 0.04 -0.03 ** -0.01 0.04 -0.03 * -0.01 0.04 -0.04 * -0.01
Low education -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
Cyclical effect -0.46 ** 0.04 0.42 ** -0.47 ** 0.04 0.43 ** -0.47 ** 0.02 0.44 **
Source: Ever Private Sector Dataset maintained by CCP at Aarhus School of Business. 
Note: *: P<0.1, **: P<0.05, ***: P<0.01.
Exits Takeovers Survivors




Exits Takeovers Survivors Survivors
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c





Table 4b: Marginal effects of Models 3a-c and 4a-c 
Models / Variables
Spin-off from exiting parent 0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.12 0.06 -0.17 ** 0.12 0.06 -0.17 **
Industry experience -0.01 -0.01 0.02 * -0.01 -0.01 0.02 *
Start-up experience -0.01 0.02 -0.01
High education 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.01
Medium education 0.04 -0.04 ** 0.00 0.04 -0.04 * 0.00 0.04 -0.04 * 0.00
Low education -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03
Cyclical effect -0.51 ** 0.06 0.45 ** -0.51 ** 0.05 0.46 ** -0.50 ** 0.04 0.46 **
Spin-off from surviving parent -0.27 *** 0.01 0.26 *** -0.29 *** 0.01 0.28 *** -0.30 *** 0.01 0.29 ***
Industry experience -0.02 ** 0.00 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 0.02 ***
Start-up experience 0.03 0.02 -0.06
High education -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Medium education 0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.13 -0.09 -0.04 0.12 -0.09 -0.04
Low education 0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.02
Cyclical effect 0.00 -0.58 0.59 -0.18 -0.59 0.77 -0.28 -0.65 * 0.93
Source: Ever Private Sector Dataset maintained by CCP at Aarhus School of Business. 
Note: *: P<0.1, **: P<0.05, ***: P<0.01.
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c
Exits Takeovers Survivors Exits Takeovers Survivors Exits
Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c
Exits Takeovers Survivors Exits Survivors Takeovers Survivors Exits Takeovers
Takeovers Survivors
 
 